Transboundary River Basins and Geopolitical Management

Egypt’s relationship with the river Nile is perceived by them to be of existential importance (Wheeler et al., 2018). 80% of the ater of the Nile however comes from Ethiopia, (Erikh, 2002; cited in Wheeler et al., 2018) and is responsible for the annual floods which bring water for drinking and irrigation, as well as rich silts that nourish the earth of the Nile River basin to the advancement of agricultural activity for the Egyptians. Whilst the UN watercourse convention (Savenjie and Van der Zaag, 2008), seeks to ensure the rights to each riparian country to equitable shares of any benefits, some examples demonstrate potential challenges of achieving this in practice.

Case Study One: The Nile

Despite strong seasonal variability, Ethiopia’s wet highlands provide water to the comparatively barren sands of Egypt (World Bank, 2021). Amidst anticipation of an intensification of the hydrological cycle, means wet regions of Africa get wetter, and dry regions drier (Hegerl et al., 2019).  The impetus for coordination and support between riparian states is vital for the mitigation of climate change’s impacts.

With 95% of the population of Cairo living on the banks of the River Nile (BBC, 2019), the river’s importance is undeniable, with it supplying 97% of the country’s freshwater (Khalifa, 2011). Unlike historically, where the hydraulic civilisation ascended through development on the river Nile, the problems facing Egypt today are less concerned with their own development.

Aerial shot of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
(The Economist, 2021)

Ethiopia completed the construction of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Ethiopian Dam (GERD) in 2021, Africa’s biggest hydroelectric powerhouse on the border with Sudan (Mulat and Moges, 2014). The dam’s benefits to Ethiopia comes in the form of opportunity, a literal spark to the electrification of the entire country, where 55% of people lack electricity supply (IEA, 2019). Through exporting the surplus energy created by the dam, Ethiopia can raise funds for further investment into infrastructural development, stimulating the economy through subsequent multiplier and accelerator effects. According to the Rocky Mountain Institute, the potential economic opportunity derived from electrifying Ethiopia’s rural farms through minigrids stands at $4BN (Rocky Mountain Institute, 2020). Whilst this change would open up a realm of opportunity never before seen, the disruption of peace across the region lurks ominously in the shadow of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (BBC News, 2018).

Controlling 85% of Egypt’s water supply, Egypt’s supply to the Nile has effectively shrunk per capita as a result. By the United Nation’s definition, any country with less than 1000 m3 of water per person per year is considered to be water scarce. By the latest figures, Egypt fits the bill (Wendover, 2020).

Location of GERD (Arp, 2021)

For the avoidance of conflict over water, it is necessary for countries upstream to mitigate impacts on countries downstream by sacrificing, or more suitably sharing benefits as the river’s capacity nears ever closer Pareto efficiency (Van Der Zaag, 2007). Ethiopia’s counterargument is that this is a global project, as opposed to one for their gain solely, with Sudan also benefitting through access to surplus electricity generated by the dam (BBC News, 2018). Ethiopia’s water minister has also offered assurances, that downstream countries will receive more, not less water following the three years it has taken to fill the reservoir behind the dam (BBC News, 2018).

Our second example takes us across the continent, to the Senegal river basin (SRB). Here things take a more convivial turn and stand as a potential model for the future of the Nile. Flowing from the water-rich Guinea and Mali downstream to comparatively drier Senegal and Mauritania, the Senegal river was acknowledged by all four nations as central to their existences. As a result, with the exception of Guinea the countries came together to produce the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur de fleuve Senegal (OMVS) to manage the river (Venema and Schiller, 1995). This ensured the drier countries enjoyed a steady supply of water for agricultural purposes, whilst those upstream benefitted from hydroelectrical benefits, which are shared (Degeorges and Reilly, 2006). Here, the river is a multinational asset, as opposed to a multinational argument. While this example not perfect, with the hydroelectric dam proving to have negative effects on fisheries in the floodplain and coastal areas (Degeorges and Reilly, 2006), it demonstrates a model of communication and informed trade-offs for the greatest benefit for all. However, given Egypt’s unwillingness to accept this shift in political power, any progress as a collective unit remains unlikely.